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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
different concepts with different, albeit at times mixed, backgrounds and
histories.36 The latter, as noted, is an absolute duty. Although one might
urge a court to consider the former also absolute and, therefore, within the
warranty of seaworthiness - i.e., an absolute duty to provide a reasonably
safe place to work - it would appear that such an argument must fail.
Until the Supreme Court chooses to obliterate the negligence-unsea-
worthiness distinction in this particular area, results such as that in Earles
would appear mandated.
3 7
C.L.P.
Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - HABEAS CORPUS - MILITARY LAW -
JURISDICTION REDEFINED TO ALLOW DE Novo REVIEW OF ISSUES OF
"PURE" CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ARTICLES 133 AND 134 OF THE
UCMJ ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD.
Levy v. Parker (3d Cir. 1973)
Petitioner Levy, an Army doctor, was convicted by a general court-
martial of violating articles 90, 133, and 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ).' The article 90 charge emanated from Levy's
wilful refusal to follow an allegedly lawful command.2 The charges stem-
While none of the cases cited by the Venable court actually stated that an allegation
of an unsafe place to work would support a claim for unseaworthiness, they do sup-
port the proposition that the shipowner must provide a fit vessel, appurtenances,
appliances, tools, gear, and crew. One might argue that those duties can be sum-
marized into the duty to provide a fit place to work and fit means with which to
do the work, that for a work area to be fit for its intended purpose it must be safe,
and that, therefore, the warranty of seaworthiness should embrace an absolute duty
to provide a reasonably safe place to work.
36. See generally Tetreault, supra note 5; Note, supra note 13.
37. To the extent that Earles may have dealt with employees covered by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the court considered a
factual situation which may no longer arise. Congress has eliminated the warranty
of seaworthiness with respect to those employees covered by the Act. See note 13
supra. However, the court's general discussion of the separation of the concepts of
negligence and unseaworthiness and its specific treatment of the question of the rela-
tionship of the warranty of seaworthiness and the duty to provide a reasonably safe
place to work provide precedent for cases dealing with injuries to members of the
crew or to those harbor workers not covered by the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)
(Supp. II, 1972).
1. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 778 (3d Cir.), review granted, ___ U.S.
(1973). See 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 933, 934 (1970).
2. 478 F.2d at 776. Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice [here-
inafter cited as UCMJ] provides in pertinent part:
Any person subject to this chapter who . . . willfully disobeys a lawful command
of his superior commissioned officer: shall be punished . . . by such punish-
ment . . . as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970).
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ming from alleged violations of articles 133 and 134 were the result of
public statements made by Levy in which he admittedly criticized the
United States government and its Vietnam war effort.3 After exhausting
all appeals in the military system, Levy filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, alleging constitutional deprivations. 4 The petition was de-
nied.5 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that its scope of review when
presented with a military prisoner's habeas corpus petition enveloped the
class of constitutional questions presented by Levy, and that articles 133
and 134 were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.6 Le-vy v. Parker,
478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.), review granted- ..... U S. (1973).
The extent to which the federal courts have jurisdiction to review a
military prisoner's court-martial conviction upon petition for a writ of
habeas corpus has long been a matter of controversy. 7 Originally, when
reviewing the habeas corpus petition of any prisoner, whether confined
under state or military law, federal courts could inquire only as to matters
of jurisdiction. 8 If the convicting court was shown to have had jurisdiction,
then the inquiry was ended, and any further inspection to uncover sub-
stantive or procedural irregularity was not permitted.9
Subsequently, in a long line of cases, the Supreme Court greatly
expanded the scope of issues cognizable during federal habeas corpus
3. 478 F.2d at 776, Article 133 of the UCMJ provides in pertinent part:
Any commissioned officer ... who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970). Article 134 of the UCMJ provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall ... be
punished.
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970).
4. Levy v. Parker, 316 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Pa. 1970). The district court noted
that petitioner did not specify the constitutional provision under which he challenged
his conviction. Id. at 476.
5. Id. at 480.
6. The court held that the application of its decision was prospective except in
those cases where the issue (1) was raised and preserved on the record, and (2)
was pending on April 18, 1973, the date of the decision. 478 F.2d at 796. The
court further found that the joinder of the article 90 charge with the article 133
and the article 134 charges prejudiced Levy's right to a fair trial. Hence it re-
manded the cause with instructions that the writ be granted unless the military grant
Levy a new trial on the article 90 charge within 90 days. Id. at 798-99.
Chief Judge Seitz concurred in the majority's opinion finding the articles un-
constitutional, but dissented from its finding that Levy had been prejudiced by the
joinder of charges. Id. at 808. Hence, he would have affirmed the district court's
denial of the writ. Id. at 813.
7. The seminal issue is whether the federal courts have any power of review
at all. Art. 76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970), provides that all judgments ren-
dered by courts-martial are "final and conclusive." While facially the statute prohibits
any collateral review by civilian federal courts, the Supreme Court, in interpreting
Article of War 50(h) of 1948, ch. 625, § 226, 62 Stat. 637-38, the predecessor of
10 U.S.C. § 876, stated that the clause did no more than describe the "terminal
point" for proceedings within the military. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132-33
(1957. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (petition for rehearing).
9. Id. at 846.
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review of state convictions,'0 finally enunciating the basic guideline of such
review in Brown v. Allen." The Court, however, did not similarly extend
the scope of federal habeas corpus review of military convictions.
In the 1940's, a number of circuits, including the Third Circuit, did
follow the expansion of issues held cognizable in civilian habeas corpus
cases and held constitutional claims to be reviewable in military habeas
corpus proceedings.' 2 While this course was temporarily terminated in
Hiatt v. Brown,1 8 wherein the Supreme Court admonished the Fifth Circuit
for extending issues cognizable beyond the mere determination of juris-
diction, a more liberal view was subsequently adopted by the Court in
Burns v. Wilson.14 Recognizing the military legal system as sui generis,
a plurality of the Justices redefined the scope of review in military habeas
corpus cases by striking a medium between the broad federal review of
state petitions and the very narrow review allowed in Hiatt. The Court
held that the function of the federal courts was limited to determining
whether the military "fully and fairly" considered each of the prisoner's
constitutional allegations.'3 If the military was found to have done so,
then the federal courts were prohibited from granting the writ "simply to
re-evaluate the evidence. 'u 6 If the military courts "manifestly refused" to
consider the allegations, however, then the federal courts were "empowered
to review them de novo."' 7
Although the Burns Court sought to clarify the scope of federal habeas
corpus review, the "fully and fairly" standard has been a difficult one for
the courts to apply. The majority of courts have interpreted it to allow
only a limited scope of review, i.e., to determine whether or not the
prisoner's claims were given due consideration by the military courts' 8
10. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1926); Ex porte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371 (1879). For a general treatment of the subject of habeas corpus, see Develop-
ments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970).
11. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Federal courts were granted the power to inquire de
novo into questions of constitutional law and to repeat the process of applying law
to facts, even where the state court had adequately considered the matter. Further-
more, when state fact-finding processes were found to be inadequate, the federal
courts were empowered to inquire de novo into issues of fact. Id. at 463-64, 506-08.
See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
12. See United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944);
Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238(M.D. Pa. 1946). See Pasley, The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial, 12
U. PiTr. L. REv. 7 (1950); Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J.
380 (1966).
13. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
14. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
15. Id. at 142.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Note, supra note 12, at 387 n.49. See, e.g., Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
937 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1965) ; Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365
(9th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
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If they were, the federal courts cannot consider the issues de novo.19 This
narrow position, which places most emphasis on the "fully" aspect,
20
was supported by the Third Circuit prior to the case at hand.2
Other courts have given "fully and fairly" a much broader inter-
pretation. A small number have taken the same stance as that adopted
by the District of Columbia Circuit in Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air
Fdrce.22 The Kauffman court construed the Burns decision as defining
the scope of review granted federal courts to be as broad on review of a
military petition as on review of a petition from a state conviction. 23 A
less expansive reading of Burns than that espoused in Kauffman, yet still
more liberal than the majority interpretation, is represented by Shaw v.
United States.2 4 The Shaw court defined "fully and fairly" to allow a
federal examination de novo into "pure issues of constitutional law,"
regardless of the military's adequacy in doing so originally.2 5 However,
unlike Kauffman, it held consideration of mixed questions of law
19. The court in Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953), stated this
proposition:
As we understand the Burns decision, it does no more than hold a military court
must consider questions relating to the guarantees afforded an accused by the
Constitution and when this is done, the civil courts will not review its action.
Id. at 487.
20. The practical effect of such a test is to restrict federal courts from inquiring
de novo into any constitutional issue raised in the military courts by petitioner as
long as the military court considered it. See Developments in the Law - Federal
Habeas Corpus, supra note 10, at 1217-18; Note, supra note 12, at 387-88.
21. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Parker, 399 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1059, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 1124 (1969). But see United
States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
395 U.S. 258 (1968), wherein the court, affirming the district courts denial of a
writ of habeas corpus, apparently reviewed de novo issues of constitutional law,
even though the district court had previously adjudged that the military courts had
given due consideration to the petitione-'s allegations. See United States ex rel.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966). The court of appeals did
not state its reason or authority for such inquiry and merely relegated any discussion
of that issue to a conclusory footnote. 390 F.2d at 363 nl. The appellate opinion
has never been cited by the Third Circuit in any decision regarding the scope of
issues cognizable by federal courts when presented with a military prisoner's writ
of habeas corpus. Furthermore, Chief Judge Seitz (then Judge Seitz), who sat on
the panel in O'Callahan, made no mention of that case in his opinion in Levy. 478
F.2d at 808-13. In light of this, the position taken by the O'Callahan court on the
question of jurisdiction and scope of allowable inquiry might properly be treated
as an aberration.
22. 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013, rehearing denied,
397 U.S. 1031 (1970); accord, In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
23. The Kauffman court stated:
The argument that military judgments are subject to less exacting scrutiny
on collateral review than state or federal judgments relies upon the statement
of a plurality of the Court in Burns v. Wilson. . . . We think . . . Burns did
not apply a standard of review different from that currently imposed in habeas
corpus review of state convictions.
415 F.2d at 997. The difficulty in accepting this position results from the unqualified
expression by the Supreme Court in Burns that ". . . in military habeas corpus the
inquiry . . . has always been more narrow than in civil cases .... " 346 U.S. at 139.
The accuracy of this latter statement, however, was questioned by Justice Frank-
furter in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 845-46 (1953) (petition for rehearing).
24. 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ; accord Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339,
342 (10th Cir. 1967).
25. 357 F.2d at 954.
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and fact to be beyond the federal courts' jurisdictional realm on review.20
When dealing with such mixed questions, the court should determine
merely whether due consideration was given to the prisoner's constitu-
tional arguments by the military courts.27
In Levy, the court was presented with the opportunity to clarify this
issue in the Third Circuit. However, while the court placed great emphasis
on its contention that review of military proceedings is not limited to
matters of jurisdiction,28 it evaded the controversy regarding the exact
definition of "fully and fairly." Nevertheless the Levy court did broaden
the scope of federal jurisdiction in military habeas corpus cases in this
circuit. Emphatically rejecting "the contention that full presentation of
constitutional issues to a court-martial precludes subsequent consideration
of those issues by a civilian court .... ,",29 the court instead endorsed the
"middle ground" approach taken in Shaw v. United States.30 It further-
more placed petitioner's attack on articles 133 and 134 within the category
of issues held cognizable in that case.8 '
Although the court's decision was based on the authority of Shaw,
there are three indications that the Third Circuit may be prepared to go
beyond the Shaw holding. The first is to be found in the court's explanation
that the underlying premise of Burns was that military personnel are to
be protected from unconstitutional treatment.3 2 The court concluded that
it was for this reason that the Burns Court, in defining the jurisdiction
granted in military habeas corpus proceedings, instructed the federal courts
to determine not only whether the military court "fully" heard the con-
stitutional issue, but also whether it "fairly" did so.33 Though it is never
expressed in the opinion, the logical question resulting from such emphasis
upon the "fair" aspect is a rhetorical one, i.e., how can any military
decision be upheld as "fairly" determined unless the federal court has
jurisdiction to examine de novo all constitutional questions of law and
fact ?34
The second indication exists in the fact that the court relied on the
Kauffman case to support its attack on the jurisdiction vel non limitation,35
rather than merely noting that such a limitation was held to be too re-
strictive by the Court in Burns.36 The Levy court's use of Kauffman, the
case which interprets "fully and fairly" most expansively, for so settled an
issue is perplexing.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 478 F.2d at 781-83. This question was obviously answered in Burns wherein
all the Justices, except Justice Minton, rejected the Hiatt v. Brown decision that
federal jurisdiction is so limited in such a case. 346 U.S. 137.
29. 478 F.2d at 783.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D. Kan. 1959).
35. 478 F.2d at 780.
36. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
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Finally, the court ambiguously concluded that a federal court, peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus by a military prisoner, has jurisdiction
to inquire de novo into allegations of constitutional deprivation "at the
very least" where those allegations deal with the pure issues of constitu-
tional law discussed in Shaw.3 7 It can be inferred, therefore, that the Third
Circuit has come close to accepting the Kauffman position. The court's
citation of that case, its emphasis on the fairness aspect of "fully and
fairly", and its ambiguous conclusion create the impression that the Third
Circuit may be merely awaiting a case in which only the full breadth of
Kauffman38 would permit a re-examination of the constitutional issues.
The factual setting of the instant case did not present such an opportunity.
The court's determination to broaden the scope of issues cognizable
when presented with a writ of habeas corpus by a military prisoner would
seem to be justifiable as a matter of policy. Peculiarities within the military
legal system, recently recognized by the Supreme Court in O'Callahan v.
Parker,39 militate in favor of such a decision.40 The practical significance
of the court's position was reflected in its examinations of the constitution-
ality of articles 133 and 134.41 Though these articles have often been chal-
lenged as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,4 2 the narrow
scope of review enjoyed by federal courts, discussed above, had previously
insulated the articles from interference by contemporary civilian courts.43
The modern precedent upholding article 134 is United States v. Frantz.44
Although the United States Court of Military Appeals admitted the "con-
37. 478 F.2d at 783.
38. It is also interesting to note that the court questioned the accuracy of the
Supreme Court's statement that inquiry of scope in military habeas corpus cases
"has always been more narrow than in civilian cases." See 478 F.2d at 782 n.10.
39. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
40.. In O'Callahan, the Supreme Court took note of the lack of independence
of the military legal system and its institutional role in the disciplinary mechanism
of the armed forces. It further explained that even though the Court of Military
Appeals recognizes certain constitutional rights of the accused, courts-martial are an
institution with a history of retributive justice and are "singularly inept" in dealing
with the "nice subtleties of constitutional law." Id. at 263-66. For a general treat-
ment of this area, see Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, supra
note 10, at 1218-20.
41. 478 F.2d at 784. The District of Columbia Circuit has also examined the
issue and has found the first two clauses of article 134 unconstitutional (article 133
and the last clause of article 134 were not at issue). See Avrech v. Secretary of
the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970)
United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967); United States
v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953); United States v. Duncan, 47
C.M.R. 66 (1973). See also Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice -
A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. REV. 142 (1959) ; Comment, The Discredit Clause
of the UCMJ: An Unrestricted Anachronism, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 821 (1971);
Note, Taps for the Real Catch-22, 81 YALE L.J. 1518 (1972).
43. In a number of earlier cases, the Supreme Court determined that prede-
cessors to articles 133 and 134 were sufficiently defined so as not to be subject to abuse.
See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858). However, in O'Callahan
v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), the Supreme Court questioned the constitutionality
of article 134, apparently inviting the federal courts to examine its validity. Id. at 265.
The Levy court took note of this. 478 F.2d at 788.
44. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953).
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ceivable presence of uncertainty" 45 in article 134, it nevertheless determined
that the article had "acquired the core of a settled and understandable con-
tent of meaning" 46 as a result of its long historical background47 and was,
therefore, constitutionally valid.
48
A basic principle of due process is that every law must establish a
standard sufficient to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.49 As a corollary, the
law must not encourage arbitrary or erratic enforcement, by leaving the
creation of a standard up to policemen or judges.50 Initially, the Levy court
searched for such standards in articles 133 and 134.51 Article 133, however,
failed to explain what conduct is "unbecoming" an officer ;52 and article 134
did not provide a clearer measure of its own requirements. Article 134 is
interpreted in the Manual for Courts-Martial by the listing of form
specifications detailing previous actions found to have contravened its pro-
visions.58 However, those specifications are not meant to be exhaustive
54
45. Id. at 163. 7 C.M.R. at 39.
46. Id.
47. The articles were originally promulgated by the British in the 17th and
18th centuries. Closely related provisions, written in substantially the same language,
were adopted by the Continental Congress in 1775, and subsequent versions have been
enacted throughout our history. See Wiener, Are the General Military Articles
Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357, 358 (1968).
48. The court stated that the 47 different offenses then listed in the MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 127c (1951), were proof of the article's
settled meaning. 2 U.S.C.M.A. at 163, 7 C.M.RI at 39.
The precedent upholding article 133 is United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967), wherein the Court of Military Appeals summarily dis-
missed any doubts about the constitutionality of that article.
49. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1927).
50. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Giacco v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1969).
51. 478 F.2d at 788-90. Unlike Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d
1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the last clause of article 134, i.e., ^crimes and offenses not
capital" was at issue in Levy. Id. at 790.
52. The Manual for Courts-Martial defines conduct unbecoming an officer as
official conduct which compromises the officer's character as a gentleman, while con-
duct unbecoming a gentleman is defined as unofficial conduct which compromises the
individual's official standing. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 212
(1969). Colonel Winthrop, quoted as authority by the U.S.C.M.A., provided no
more thorough a definition, by defining violative behavior as that type which offends
"so seriously against law, justice, morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace, socially
or as a man, the offender . . . ." W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
711-12 (2d ed. 1920), cited in United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 177-78,
37 C.M.R. 429, 441-42 (1967).
53. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, App. 6c, 11 126-88 (1969).
This list of offenses cognizable was proof to the Court of Military Appeals, in
Frantz, that the article had acquired a settled meaning. See note 48 supra.
54. As the court in Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir.
1973), pointed out, the Manual for Courts-Martial's specifications are not meant to
be controlling substantive law. Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237, 1242(D.C. Cir. 1973). They are only meant to serve as a "substitute for legal research
facilities." Id. Hence, it is not necessary that a serviceman's conduct fit a Manual
specification. Id. at 1243.
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and the list continues to grow5 5 as new actions are held to be violative of
the standard of which they become a part.5
As an adjunct of the articles' lack of definable standards, the Levy
court found that they had a "real capacity" for discriminatory and arbi-
trary enforcement.5 7 The articles are vulnerable to such a charge and have
been the basis for prosecution on moral5s and political grounds. 59 The
Manual for Courts-Martial, moreover, instructs the courts-martial to set
maximum sentences for new violations by analogizing them to related
ones for which there are already established maximums.6 0 Since "new"
actions may be held to constitute conduct violative of articles 133 and 134,
the possibility of erratic enforcement is obvious.6 1
In addition, the articles belong to that class of statutes which have
a capacity to abridge sensitive areas of first amendment freedoms.6 2 The
Supreme Court has stated that governmental enactments regulating in this
area must be drawn with "narrow specificity" 6 in order to prevent a
"chilling effect" upon the exercise of first amendment rights by individuals
who, unable to distinguish legal activity from that which has been declared
criminal, curtail their lawful conduct for fear of violating the law.64
Articles 133 and 134, devoid of definable standards, were found to have
failed this test.65
Although the Levy court found that the articles were unconstitution-
ally vague, overbroad, and vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement, it did not
strike them down without first inquiring into the existence of any counter-
vailing considerations inherent in the military system which would justify
their continued existence.6 6 However, neither the need to preserve high
55. In 1953, 47 offenses were listed; in 1967, the number had increased to 58;
while in 1968, 63 violations were specified. 478 F.2d at 791.
56. Even though the violations listed in the Manual for Courts-Martial provide
a standard which may warn against such violative conduct in the future, article 134
could still be adjudged overbroad for:[if] on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process clause,
specification of details of the offense . . . would not serve to validate it . . . . It is
the statute, not the accusation under it, that ... warns against transgressions ....
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), quoted in 478 F.2d at 791.
57. 478 F.2d at 793. The court stated that "[a]rbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement of such laws is a fortiori." Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958);
United States v. Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325 (1956).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
60. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, II 127c (1969).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 12 C.M.R. 102
(1953).
62. 478 F.2d at 793. See, e.g., United States v. Amick, 40 C.M.R. 720 (1968)
(review denied).
63. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
64. Id.
65. 478 F.2d at 794. The court also took note of the fact that as applied to Levy
the articles might not have been vague. However, applying the Supreme Court's
rule on standing to attack an overbroad statute, the court held that even if the
articles were not vague with respect to the charge against Levy, he could still attack
the statute in order that society might be benefited. Id., citing Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
66. 478 F.2d at 795.
[VOL. 19
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professional standards,67 the need for "ease of conviction ;in :a court-
martial,"' 8 nor the necessity of punishing servicemen for unforeseen crimes 6
was held to be sufficient justification. 0 Since the court could find- no con-
struction or justification which would eliminate the articles' constitutional
deficiencies, it declared them to be unconstitutional.71
Implicit within the Levy court's analysis was the notion that service-
men are entitled to the protections afforded them under the Constitution.72
Although the United States Court. of Military Appeals has declared that
to be the case,7 3 references to compelling interests of the military have
often been utilized as justification for questionable application of that prin-
ciple.7 4 The Levy court did not accept the facial validity of. such justifi-
cations in its review of the "General Articles."' 5 Instead, it examined the
evidence itself and determined that no such interests existed. Such an
independent approach is essential to a full and fair hearing of any challenge
to the constitutionality of other military statutes.70
Unless federal courts enjoy broad jurisdiction to inquire de novo
into constitutional issues presented by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
by a military prisoner, continued collateral examination of the validity of
military statutes cannot proceed. The instant decision aids this inquiry
and affords servicemen impartial review of constitutional. questions by a
court divorced from the military system.
P.L.F.
67. Id., citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
68. 478 F.2d at 795.
69. Id. at 795-96. The "unforeseen crimes" justification examined by the court
was the question of "the desirability of allowing the military to develop a counterpart
of common law crimes." Id. at 795.
70. Id. at 796. The court in Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237(D.C. Cir. 1973), took note of the fact that Kenneth J. Hodson, the present ChiefJudge of the Court of Military Appeals, has recommended the abolition of article 134.
Id. at 1242.
71. 478 F.2d at 796. Generally the third clause of article 134 -- "crimes and
offenses not capital" - is not attacked when the constitutionality of the article isdebated. See Wiener, supra note 47, at 358. The Levy court, however,' referred tothis clause as a "cryptic phrase" which amounts to a "veritable criminal code of its
own," and declared the entire article to be unconstitutional. 478 F.2d at 790.
72. The Constitution specifically exempts the Grand Jury . requirement in cases
arising "in the land or naval forces." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Furthermore, it hasbeen implied that trial by petit jury is not required in military law. See Whelchel'
v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
73. See United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 633, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254(1967); accord, United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430, 29 C.M.R. 244,
246-47 (1960).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163-64, 7 C.M.R. 37,39-40 (1953). See also United States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 66, 42 C.M.R., 255;258 (1970). The attenuated logic of the court in Gray is pointed out in. Sherman,The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J.
325, 337 (1970).
75. 478 F.2d at 795.
76. E.g., art. 88, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1970). For a discussion of article.88,
which prohibits the uttering of "contemptuous words" by commissioned 'officers
against the President, Vice President, Congress, Secretaries, Governors, and legisla-
tures, in the context of the case of United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37C.M.R. 429 (1967), see Sherman, supra note 74, at 334-52. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSES - CLERGY'S CLAIMED FREE EXERCISE RIGHT TO CONDUCT
SERVICES IN STATE PRISON HELD A VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE - PRISON INMATES MAY HAVE A FREE EXERCISE
RIGHT TO CLERGY VISITATIONS.
O'Malley v. Brierley (3d Cir. 1973)
Three inmates of a Pennsylvania state prison and two priests brought
suit against the warden and other state officials under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' The priests alleged that the warden's refusal to allow them to
conduct "Afro-American Masses ' 2 and his revocation of their limited visit-
ing privileges infringed certain inmates' religious freedom and violated
the priests' right to freely counsel and perform religious services.3 In
addition, the priests alleged that their visiting privileges had been revoked
solely because they had exercised their right of free speech 4 by conducting
a peaceful demonstration, outside of the prison, against prison conditions. 5
The warden, however, claimed that the revocation was based upon his fear
of disruption. 6 The inmates alleged that their right to freely exercise their
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
-42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. The Afro-American Mass was allegedly an attempt to employ traditional
liturgy to relate Jesus to the condition of black prison inmates. O'Malley v. Brierley,
477 F.2d 785, 786 (3d Cir. 1973).
3. The religion clauses of the first amendment provide: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. These provisions are applicable to state action
through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940). The priests based their free exercise claim on the need to extend to prisons
,the concept that "[sipreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through
-distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old
type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more
orthodox types," Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943).
4. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
:grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. These provisions are applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. 'New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).5. 477 F.2d at 789. The priests challenged their exclusion from the prison
,on the theory that the state cannot burden the exercise of one constitutional right(religion) as a consequence of the exercise of another right (speech and assembly).
Id. at 793. The priests relied upon the following cases: Baird v. State Bar of Ariz.,
401 U.S. 1 (1971) (a state could not withhold the right to practice law from an
applicant who refused to answer questions concerning political affiliations because
to sustain such inquiries would discourage the exercise of constitutional rights);
Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970) (excluding a civilian from a
military base because of her political activity, causing her to lose her job, inhibited
-the exercise of her first amendment rights); Taylor v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n,
424 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1970) (federal court subject matter jurisdiction was properly
invoked by a complaint that alleged the use of disbarment to inhibit the right of
.free speech).
6. 477 F.2d at 787.
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religion was abridged because they were unable to have those priests visit
them. 7 Neither priest was a designated prison chaplain,8 and the defendants
contended that no free exercise problem existed with respect to the inmates
since two official prison chaplains had never been denied access to the
inmates.9
Although the affidavits submitted by both sides showed factual dis-
putes, 10 the district court ruled that both complaints failed to state a cause
of action and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment."'
The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that to
grant the priests' claim would violate the establishment clause, that. the
priests, therefore, had no free exercise right to enter the prison and that
the priests thus could not have been deprived of that right as a result of
their demonstration. The court further held that the inmates had stated
a cause of action in alleging a violation of their free exercise right. That
claim was remanded for trial. O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir.
1973).
The Supreme Court has readily admitted the difficulties inherent in
the application of the religion clauses of the first amendment.' 2 In dealing
with the free exercise clause, the Court has evolved a test which requires
the balancing of a state's interest in pursuing a particular policy against
the burden that policy imposes upon the free exercise of religion.13  In
7. Id. at 795.
8. Id. at 786.
9. Id. at 788.
10. The priests alleged that they had conducted religious services intendedto relate to black inmates, and that their participation in the demonstration outside
the prison was lawful and peaceful. The defendants alleged that the religious
service was a political rally with the theme of black militancy, and that thedemonstration was designed to incite a prison riot. The warden further allegedthat there had been no interference with the practice of the Catholic religion by
inmates. Id. at 786-87.
11. Id. at 786.
12. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,761 n.5 (1973) (New York statute providing state monies to sectarian schools for
maintenance and repairs, and tuition grants and tax benefits for parents void as a
violation of the establishment clause) ; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612'(1971) (state statutes that provided for various forms of aid to sectarian schools
void on establishment clause grounds); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78(1971) (grants to religious colleges for secular construction held to be not violative.
of the establishment clause) ; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)(tax exemptions for religious property used solely for religious purposes held not to be.
violative of the establishment clause).
13. Early cases sustained a free exercise claim when it was joined with an.
allegation of abridgment of freedom of speech or of the press, but denied reliefif the other rights were not involved. Compare Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105 (1943) with Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See Pfeffer, TheSupremacy of Free Exercise, 61 Gso. L.J. 1115, 1130 (1973). For a general discussion
of the free exercise clause see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and*Doctrinal Development Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. U. REv.
1381 (1967).Later cases have sustained a free exercise claim on its own merits. Wisconsin,
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (state law requiring Amish children to remainin school, in opposition to the mandates of their parents' religious belief, violated
the parents' free exercise rights) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963)(state's interest in preventing fraudulent unemployment claims did not override.
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determining whether government action violates the establishment clause,
the Court has evolved three tests :14
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years ....
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . . . finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion."'I5
These tests are used as guidelines to prevent the main evils against which
the establishment clause affords protection: "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."1
the free exercise right of a person whose religious tenents forbade working on
Saturday).
The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder described the balancing test to be em-
ployed in free exercise cases:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond
the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the
practice of legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does
not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there
is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.
406 U.S, at 214. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
14. The Supreme Court's treatment of establishment clause issues began, for
-all practical purposes, with Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In
Everson the Court held that payments to parents of parochial school children pursuant
to a statute providing reimbursement for the expense of transporting children to
school on public transportation did not violate the establishment clause. Id. at 17.
The Everson Court spoke of the doctrine of state neutrality, but focused primarily
on the concept of separation. Id. at 18. The neutrality concept was developed in
later cases. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), wherein the Court
'held that released time programs which allowed time off from public school to
-attend religious classes away from school did not violate the establishment clause.
See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), wherein the Court
-articulated a working test based on neutrality:
[Wlhat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
id. at 222.
15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678
(1971). For more recent affirmations of this test, see Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) ; Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
16. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It should be noted that
it is rare for issues to be presented under only one clause or the other. An exemption
from a state law on religious grounds may aid religion, and therefore, constitute
-a potential establishment clause violation. See note 40 infra. Conversely, finding that
a state law violates the establishment clause may impose a burden on the free
exercise of religion. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
The Supreme Court has characterized this problem as trying "to find a
neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 668-69. See Giannella, supra
note 14, at 1389. See also P. KAUPER, God & Caesar, in FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAt
LIBERTY 100 (1971).
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In the instant case, the court initially addressed the priests' claim.",
After noting that the priests had standing to assert only their own consti-
tutional rights,' the court considered their first contention, the alleged
violation of their free exercise right of entry into the prison which was
based upon "the proposition that a clergyman has a First Amendment right
enforced through the Fourteenth Amendment, to conduct religious services
and offer religious counsel in a state institution."'19
Rather than analyzing the priests' claimed free exercise right in de-
tail,20 the court chose to treat the claim as one grounded fundamentally in
establishment clause problems.21 The priests' alleged cause of action was
considered to be based upon the theory that "a state may properly bestow
upon a clergyman a right of constitutional dimension to practice a religion
in a state institution under the auspices, sponsorship, and protection of the
state government and federal constitution." 22 Finding the neutrality man-
date of the school prayer decisions 23 controlling, the court determined that
the granting of the claim would result in an establishment clause violation.2 4
Having so concluded, the court easily disposed of the priests' conten-
tion that their rights of free speech, assembly, and petition had been in-
fringed by the revocation of prison access rights in violation of the religion
clauses.25 The priests had urged that their religious rights had been
infringed as a result of their exercise of free speech rights in a peaceful
demonstration, claiming that such action violated precedent which prohibited
the burdening of one constitutional right because of the lawful exercise of
another.26 The court considered that since there was neither any denial of
public employment,27 nor, because of the establishment clause problem, any
denial of a constitutional right,28 the principle was inapplicable. 29 The
court, therefore, held that the priests' claim failed to state a valid cause
of action.30
17. See note 3 supra.
18. 477 F.2d at 788-89. The priests did not have standing to assert the rights
of the inmates as the inmates did not constitute a class whose claims could be
adequately represented only by the priests. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
458-59 (1958). The court of appeals would, therefore, examine only the priests'
rights in order to determine the sufficiency of their claim. 477 F.2d at 788-89.
19. 477 F.2d at 789. See note 3 supra.
20. 477 F.2d at 793.
21. Id. at 791.
22. Id. at 789.
23. The school prayer mandate was articulated because, "[required Bible read-
ings] are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of
the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding
nor opposing religion." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225(1963). See note 15 supra.
24. 477 F.2d at 791-92.
25. Id. at 794.
26. See note 7 supra.
27. 477 F.2d at 793-94, citing Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970).
28. 477 F.2d at 794, citing Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
Taylor v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 424 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1970).
29. These factors had been present in previous cases applying the principle. See
note 7 supra,
30. 477 F.2d at 794-95.
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The court determined that the inmates' claim presented issues which
rested more fundamentally on standard free exercise clause balancing prin-
ciples and remanded it for trial.3 ' The court noted that the determination
of the inmates' rights required weighing the desire for maximum freedom
of religion against the necessities of sound prison administration.3 2  The
court stated that the balancing of these interests in the prison context is
generally within the province of prison officials, since the inmates' religious
freedom is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted to facilitate the
maintenance of prison order. 33 With these principles in mind, the court
found the district court's grant of summary judgment improper.34 The
discrepancies in the affidavits' 5 prevented the court from saying as a matter
of law that the need to exclude the priests outweighed the free exercise
burden thereby imposed upon the inmates.3 6 Such a finding, the court
cautioned, could be supported only "if the alternative chosen [complete
exclusion] resulted in the least possible 'regulation' of the constitutional
right consistent with the maintenance of prison discipline.
'83
The court's decision to remand the prisoners' claim for trial under
the balancing test did not add to or change existing law.' 8 However, its
disposal of the priests' claim on establishment clause grounds does create
problems in first amendment analysis.
One potential problem is raised by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Wisconsin v. Yoder,'9 which would seem to require that a court give
priority to a colorable free exercise claim which concomitantly involves a
potential establishment clause violation.40 In O'Malley, the court disposed
31. Id. at 795. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
32. 477 F.2d at 795.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 796.
35. See note 10 supra.
36. 477 F.2d at 796.
37. Id. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
38. For example, the Supreme Court has held that, although a state is not
required to give identical facilities to all religious groups in a prison, "reasonable
opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom
garanteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear of penalty."
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (emphasis added).
The balancing test employed by the Third Circuit to determine the reason-
ableness of a prison regulation was articulated in Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d
Cir. 1968). Accord, Wilson v. Prasse, 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971) ; Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 42$5
F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
Other circuits apply the same test in balancing the needs of prison admin-
istration against the inmates' claim of infring, ment of their constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sharp v. Sigler,
408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966);
Pierce v. LaValle, 212 F. Supp. 865 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 319 F.2d 966
(2d Cir. 1963).
39. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
40. The Yoder opinion stated that:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obliga-
tion of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment
Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter
how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free
exercise.
Id. at 220-21. See note 16 supra.
[VOL. 19
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/5
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
-of the priests' free exercise claim as a result of its finding that an establish-
ment clause violation was involved, thus appearing to reverse the Yoder
priorities. However, cases subsequent to Yoder have cast doubt upon the
view that any colorable free exercise claim must be sustained to the diminu-
tion of what a court may feel to be more pressing establishment clause
issues. 41 Because the priorities are at best ambiguous, the O'Malley court's
view that the establishment clause issues predominated is at least as tenable
as an approach that would require free exercise analysis before reaching
establishment clause issues.
Even absent clear conflict with Ydder, the court's disposal of the
priests' claim as an establishment clause violation creates problems. The
court viewed the priests' free exercise claim as a violation of the mandate of
the school prayer cases42 because:
To conclude otherwise would be to suggest in the context of the
school prayer format that although a student or secular teacher may
not read passages from the Bible or recite some non-denominational
prayer, a clergyman is clothed with the constitutional right to enter
that classroom and lead the prayers under the pretext that his presence
is demanded by students under the Free Exercise Clause. 43
In so analogizing to the school prayer cases, the court has posited an
.establishment clause analysis that cannot be sustained under careful scru-
tiny. Quite simply, the school and the prison situations are too distinguish-
able to permit meaningful comparison.
First, there is a definite distinction between the orientations of school
children and prisoners. In dealing with aid to religiously-oriented schools,
the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of financial assistance
to religiously-affiliated colleges while finding similar support of other non-
,secular education to be an establishment clause violation.44 In distinguish-
ing the two types of aid, one factor the plurality found significant was the
finding that college students are less impressionable than younger students. 4
Aid to lower education was thus considered to be closer to a sponsorship
41. The Yoder Court used language that seemed to require free exercise
supremacy. See note 40 supra. However, the Court found no establishment clause
violation in Yoder. 406 U.S. at 234 n.22. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, Com-
pulsory Education, and The First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W.VA. L. Rzv.
213, 244 (1973). See also Pfeffer, supra note 14, at 1142.
Significantly, in dealing with the latest parochial school aid cases the
Court treated the establishment clause issues and disposed of the alleged free
exercise issue in the statement that neither the burden on the parents' free exercise
Tight nor the high social importance of the law's purpose could "justify an eroding
of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted." Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89 (1973).
42. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
43. 477 F.2d at 791.
44. Compare Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) with Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (Mr. Justice White
,concurred in the result but thought that aid to elementary education should be
-sustained. Id. at 671). See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development, Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv.
513, 583 (1968).
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of religion.4 6 It seems that this type-of distinction can be applied as well
to adult prisoners. The prisoners' age makes them less impressionable and
this decreased susceptibility means that the establishment danger is not the
same as in the school prayer cases. 47
Second, it is submitted that the voluntary character of religious ob-
servance in prison demonstrates another flaw in the court's analogy. In
the school prayer cases, the Court's finding of an establishment violation
was not influenced by the fact that a child could request to be excused
from the exercises, since peer group and social pressure rendered the pro-
vision for excuse ineffective.48 Therefore, attendance at the religious
observances was not truly voluntary. In prison, the voluntary character of
religious services is clearer because the prisoners are adults, and peer
group pressure would probably push towards avoidance rather than par-
ticipation in religious observance.49 Finally, the fact that the prisoners in
this case requested the presence of the priests clearly indicated their willing-
ness to partake of the services offered. 50
Third, the nature of the state involvement with religion in a grant of
prison access is quite different from that in the school prayer cases, which
involved state laws mandating certain prescribed religious exercises in
public schools.5 ' Those laws were found to violate the state neutrality
mandate of the establishment clause, 52 a concept the importance of which
the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize. 53 However, a grant of
access to the priests in O'Malley would involve neither a requirement that
the inmates attend religious services 54 nor a dictation of the content of the
religious services.55 This lower degree of state involvement decreases the
establishment danger and further weakens the court's analogy.
In addition to the failure of analogy, the court's analysis with regard
to the presence of official prison chaplains is puzzling. 5 The relevance
of their presence was not made clear,57 and the court reached no decision
as to its constitutionality. 58 Arguably, the problem of state involvement
increases when the institution officially designates a chaplain to serve
46. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-87 (1971). See Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973).,
47. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298-99 (1963>
(Brennan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 224-25; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
49. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298-99 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring).
50. 477 F.2d at 795.
51. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962).
52. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-24 (1962).
53. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,.
397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
54. Any state-required attendance would be viewed as a clear establishment of
religion. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
55. Cf. Id. at 205, 211; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-24 (1962).
56. 477 F.2d at 792-93.
57. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
58. 477 F.2d at 792-93.
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the inmates, 59 and in light of the court's reasoning it is hard to understand
how the presence of official prison chaplains would not violate the establish-
ment clause. However, in view of Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring lan-
guage in Abington School District v. Schempp6 ° implying the constitu-
tionality of official chaplains,6 1 the court was undoubtedly correct in not
even hinting at this result. Yet, O'Malley does lead to the anomalous
result that, while the presence of the chaplain with more state involvement
may be constitutional, the chaplain seeking only access is barred by the
establishment clause.
The analytical problems created by the court's finding of an establish-
ment clause violation make it difficult to assess the importance of its de-
cision. A practical explanation for the court's decision may lie in the fact
that any recognition of the priests' claimed free exercise right would raise
the danger of creating an essentially unbridled right of entry in the future
for those who might assert a similar interest. In contrast, when the focus
is placed upon the inmates' free exercise right to have the priests enter,
the court may balance the state interest in prison order against the burden
on religious exercise, thus avoiding blanket endorsement of access where
other interests may be compromised. 62 Thus explained, the end result is
not as difficult to understand as the court's seemingly misplaced reliance
on the establishment clause, which, it is submitted, created an establishment
clause problem when it was unnecessary to reach that issue. The court,
instead, could have embarked upon a free exercise analysis in order to
obtain the balance of interests it apparently sought. In so doing, it could
have refused to extend the right to spread religious beliefs to support the
priests' claimed prison access rights.63 A strong state interest in the
preservation of public order would seem to justify the subordination of
access privileges to the needs of public safety.6 4
In addition to its apparently misplaced reliance upon the establishment
clause, the O'Malley court ignored Justice Brennan's admonition, in con-
currence, that the school prayer cases presented a unique situation,6"
and attempted to extend their rationale to a factually dissimilar situation.6 6
Thus, the establishment clause reasoning of O'Malley is less than persua-
sive and, it is hoped, will have limited future application.
L.G.R.
59. The court speaks of prison officials "approving" an official prison chaplain.
Id. at 793.
60. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
61. Id. Cf. id. at 226 n.10.
62. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
63. The right to spread one's religious beliefs outside the prison context was
upheld in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943). The priests urged
that this right required that they be given access to the prisoners. See note 3 supra.
64. See Giannella supra note 13, at 1396.
65. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
66. See notes 42-55 and accompanying text supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EVIDENCE - DEFENDANT'S SILENCE
IN POLICE CUSTODY ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
WHEN INCONSISTENT WITH DEFENDANT'S SUBSEQUENT TRIAL
TESTIMONY.
United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey (3d Cir. 1973)
Petitioner, Edward Burt, was convicted of second degree murder
for admittedly shooting an acquaintance.' At trial, the petitioner testified
that the shooting was accidental; however, a disparate description of the
incident was given by another witness.2
Following the shooting, a local police officer had discovered a broken
window in a store and had found Burt inside, asleep with a revolver in
his pocket.8 He arrested Burt, charging him with breaking and entering.4
Burt was not, however, connected with the shooting until late that same
evening.' It was undisputed that until he was questioned by the police
about the shooting, he had neither sought aid for the decedent nor in-
formed anyone else about the shooting.6
During cross-examination of the petitioner at trial, the prosecution
established Burt's precustody failure to aid the decedent in any way, and
his silence in regard to the shooting when arrested for breaking and
entering.7 The apparent purpose of this tactic was to demonstrate a
claimed inconsistency between Burt's conduct and that which would
normally be expected after a truly accidental shooting.8 After exhausting
1. State v. Burt, 59 N.J. 156, 157, 279 A.2d 850 (1971) (per curiam).
2. There were no eyewitnesses to the event. Conflicting testimony was given by
a witness who had been in another room at the time of the shooting. Id. at 158-60,
279 A.2d at 850-51 (Hall, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 160-61, 279 A.2d at 852.
4. Id. at 161, 279 A.2d at 852.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 160, 279 A.2d at 852.
7. It was the admissibility of the following conversation during cross-examina-
tion that was at issue:Q. Did you ever tell this story to the police?
A. No, sir.
Q. You are telling us now that this shooting was accidental, is that correct?
A. It was accidental, sir.
Q. But you never told the police that?
A. No, sir.
Q. And it didn't occur to you to call anybody or tell anybody about what
had happened?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you didn't tell - up to the time you got to the Camden jail you
didn't tell anybody about Shorty, did you?
A. No, sir.
No objection was raised until the following morning, when defense counsel asked for
a curative instruction fearing the jury would construe this exchange to mean that
,the defendant was under some obligation to reveal something to the police when he
was under no constitutional obligation to do so. No specific curative instruction was
,given. Id. at 161-62. 279 A.2d at 852-53.
8. Id. at 163, 279 A.2d at 853.
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his state remedies,9 Burt petitioned the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey for a writ of habeas corpus, which was
granted.10 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the prosecution's
use of petitioner's silence in police custody to impeach his trial testimony
which was inconsistent with that silence was not reversible error. United
States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1973) (per
curiam).
It is clear that the police have no power to compel a defendant's
statements at any pretrial stage." Moreover, any attempt to elicit in-
formation must be preceded by a statement of the defendant's constitu-
tional right to remain silent.' 2 However, the circumstances under which
the prosecution may capitalize on the defendant's exercise of that right
to silence by reference to it are less clear.13
In Raffel v. United States,14 the Supreme Court held that failure to
take the stand at a first trial could be used at a second in which the
defendant did take the stand only to impeach his testimony if inconsistent
with his previous silence.' The need to establish the inconsistency of a
defendant's pretrial silence with his later trial testimony as a prerequisite
to its use was emphasized is Grunewald v. United States,16 wherein the
9. State v. Burt, 107 N.J. Super. 390, 258 A.2d 711 (App. Div. 1969) ; 59 N.J.
156, 279 A.2d 850 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
10. United States ex rel. Burt v. Yeager, 342 F. Supp. 188 (D.N.J. 1972).
11. Traditionally, a privilege can be asserted only in situations where the
privilege holder is subject to possible legal compulsion. Since the police have no legal
right to compel an answer, one under police interrogation could not, logically, assert
a privilege against answering at that stage. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 329
n.27 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See generally Note, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: Does it Exist in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REv. 459 (1953).
However, since Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the privilege has been
extended to police interrogations, because of the "informal compulsion" that may be
exerted. Id. at 461.
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
13. A comparison may be drawn at this point to comment by the prosecution on
a defendant's exercise of the right to silence at trial, as granted by the fifth amend-
ment: "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60
(1893), the Court interpreted the Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30, the
predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970), which provides that defendant's "failure to
make such request [to be a witness at his trial] shall not create any presumption
against him." The Court therein held that no inference of guilt could be drawn, even
implicitly, by the prosecutor after a defendant failed to testify at his trial. The rule
of Wilson was applied to the states via Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
which emphasized that a price may not be put on the exercise of a constitutional right.
For statutes of states within the Third Circuit which controlled until Griffin,
see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3501 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (Supp.
1973) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964). Of the three, only New Jersey allowed
comment on a defendant's failure to testify at trial. Some judicial systems require
that a defendant's silence be noted for consideration. See Schaefer, Police Interroga-
tion and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 506, 514 n.36
(1966). It should be noted that statistics indicate that a majority of laymen associate
a defendant's failure to take the stand with guilt. See Comment, To Take the Stand
or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of a Defendant with a Criminal Record,
4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215, 221-22 (1968).
14. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
15. Id. at 497.
16. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
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Court noted that pretrial inconsistent silence may be utilized as a pretrial
inconsistent statement for purposes of impeachment. 1 7  More recently,
the Court held, in Harris v. New York,' s that pretrial, in-custody state-
ments may be introduced to attack the credibility of a defendant's trial
testimony if the Raffel criterion of inconsistency is met, 19 even if such
statements were elicited without the required Miranda warnings.20 In
order to hold evidence of the instant petitioner's silence admissible, there-
fore, the Burt court had to determine that his silence was not ambiguous,
and was a form of statement that was clearly inconsistent with his later
trial testimony.
In analyzing the facts of the instant case, the Burt court noted that
Miranda precluded the prosecution from introducing the fact that one
"stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation,"2' but read
precedent to mandate, at the same time, the prevention of a perjured
defense.22 Stating that Burt was not accused of the shooting while being
held for breaking and entering, and noting an inconsistency between
Burt's silence and the trial claim of accident, the court concluded that
his silence was admissible to impeach his trial testimony.2 3 The Burt
court also stated that, regardless of whether or not it was correct in
accepting the prosecution's claim that Burt's silence was inconsistent
with his exculpatory trial testimony, the admission of such evidence was
not cause for reversal.2 4 Contrasting the conflicting testimony of Burt
and the other witness, 2 the court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's determination,2 6 and relied upon the rule
that there is no reason to disturb a judgment unless it is inconsistent with
substantial justice.2 7
Judge Rosenn, in his concurring opinion, placed great emphasis upon
Harris, stating that the prosecution's use of Burt's silence focused on
non-action in the face of allegedly innocent conduct, which non-action
17. The Supreme Court in Grunewald clarified the effect of Raffel by stating:
We do not think that Raffel is properly to be read either as dispensing with the
need for such preliminary scrutiny by the judge [to be satisfied that prior silence
is in fact inconsistent], or as establishing as a matter of law that such a prior
claim of privilege with reference to a question later answered at trial is always
to be deemed to be a prior inconsistent statement, irrespective of the circumstances
under which the claim of privilege was made.
Id. at 419.
18. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
19. Id. at 225-26.
20. Id. at 224. See generally The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3,
44 (1971).
21. 475 F.2d at 236 (emphasis supplied by the court).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 235.
26. Id. at 237.
27. See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE If 61.04[2], at 61-68 (2d ed. 1973). See
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Before a court can hold a federal constitutional errorharmless, it must be able to show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).
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was clearly inconsistent with Burt's trial testimony. 28 By omitting con-
siderations of any harmless error rule, Judge Rosenn implied that the
case should be resolved solely by following precedent regarding the use
of prior silence to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. However, when
the Burt opinion is resolved only in terms of case history in this area, the
lack of a clear line of controlling decisions becomes apparent.2
Judge Rosenn found Burt's silence inconsistent with his trial testi-
mony despite the fact that his silence was with regard to an occurrence
about which he was not confronted.3 0 The apparent ease with which this
inconsistency was found belies the difficulty other circuit courts have
experienced in clearer situations. For example, although the Fifth Cir-
cuit has approved the admission of evidence that a defendant did not
give an exculpatory statement to police prior to or at arrest,3 ' the Tenth
Circuit, in Johnson v. Patterson,3 2 and the Ninth Circuit, in Fowle v.
United States,83 have held the prosecution's use, for impeachment pur-
poses, of a defendant's silence at arrest grounds for reversal. The Fowle
court stated:
A person's silence in most circumstances is so highly ambiguous that
it is generally inadmissible, for its lack of probative value, on the
question of whether, by his silence, that person has expressed agree-
ment or disagreement with contemporaneous statements of others.3
4
The Fowle court would thus carefully scrutinize a defendant's pretrial
silence, even when it occurs in the face of accusation. 5 It must be em-
phasized that the silence in Burt did not occur in the face of a murder
accusation - the silence occurred before Burt was confronted with that
charge.8 6 Notwithstanding that fact, the Burt court ignored the possibility
that Burt's silence was consistent with the situation.
A case very similar to Burt is Marshall v. State,3 7 wherein the
defendant was convicted of murder despite his trial claim that the shoot-
ing was accidental. 8  The prosecutor asked why the defendant did not
stop passing police to tell them there had been an accident.3 9 Objection was
raised, but the court stated that since the question did not specifically
relate to the time while defendant was under arrest, no error had been
committed. 40 If one accepts the Marshall court's reasoning in approach-
28. 475 F.2d at 238 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
29. Compare Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), with Fowle
v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969).
30. 475 F.2d at 238 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
31. Sharp v. United States, 410 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1969). See also United States
v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
32. 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
33. 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 50.
35. Id.
36. 475 F.2d at 236.
37. 471 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
38. Id. at 68.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 70.
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ing the problem, the conclusion follows that questions eliciting the reason
why Burt told no one of the accident before his arrest should be allowed
to stand. However, questions relating to silence while in custody, but
before confrontation with the murder charge, remain troublesome. To
resolve the problem posed by the instant case by merely concluding that
it did not involve reversible error does nothing to clarify the problems of
the admissibility of a defendant's pretrial silence. The Burt court did
not clearly delineate when such silence is admissible, nor did it set a
precedent of careful scrutiny of individual circumstances for future
cases. The Supreme Court indicated the need for such scrutiny when
considering in-custody statements in Miranda v. Arizona.41 The court
there stated:
[Als a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated
setting of the police station may well be greater than in court or
other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers
to guard against intimidation or trickery.42
The possibility that the atmosphere of the police station may also create
a fear-induced silence would appear to demand that extra care be taken
when determining the admissibility at trial of in-custody silence. Burt
may reasonably have feared that, since he had a gun in his possession
and had broken into a store, any explanation offered to police would not
be believed. He might have feared that the police would coerce confus-
ing statements from him.
Before any custody at all, a defendant's silence might be properly
termed an unnatural act in the light of a trial defense of accident, self-
defense, or mistake. However, at some point, what may have been an
unnatural, or inconsistent act may become silence induced by the pres-
ence of police. A mere stop by police on the street may be intimidating
enough to term any silence as natural.43 It is submitted that a court
should carefully scrutinize the entire fact situation in each case before it
concludes that, under some specific set of circumstances, a defendant's
silence is inconsistent with his later trial testimony and admissible for
impeachment purposes.
M.P.B.
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. Id. at 461.
43. See notes 33 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCH AND
SEIZURE - SEARCH UNDER VALID WARRANT NOT VIOLATIVE
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DUE TO ABSENCE OF OCCUPANT FROM
DWELLING.
United States v. Gervato (3d Cir. 1973)
The defendant was indicted for violating the Federal Food and
Drug Act' on the basis of evidence seized in a search of his apartment
during his absence. Although the Government's search had been con-
ducted pursuant to a valid warrant,2 the trial court suppressed the evi-
dence seized on the ground that the known absence of the defendant
from the premises made the search unreasonable and violative of the
fourth amendment.3 The Third Circuit vacated the district court's order,
holding that the fourth amendment does not require an occupant to be
present before his home may be searched pursuant to a valid search
warrant, and that the search as conducted had been reasonable. United
States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied- U.S. ____ (1973).
The issue of whether or not an occupant's initial presence is consti-
tutionally required for the execution of an otherwise valid search of his
dwelling has rarely been raised,4 and was a question of first impression
in the Third Circuit.5 The district court had found support for the
defendant's attack on the search in the "historical context" of the fourth
amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 The
lower court determined that this type of search could lead to the excesses
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970). The defendant was charged with the illegal
manufacture and possession of lysergic acid amide. United States v. Gervato, 474
F.2d 40, 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. (1973).
2. While the defendant had moved to suppress the evidence on a variety of
grounds, the trial court granted defendant's motion solely on the basis of the alleged
unlawful entry, stating that for the purpose of the opinion the warrant was valid and
was lawfully executed in time and scope. United States v. Gervato, 340 F. Supp. 454,
456 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The validity of the entry was thus the only issue on appeal.
474 F.2d at 41.
3. 340 F. Supp. at 464. Appellee's apartment had been under surveillance for
some time, and the Government knew when it served the warrant that the dwelling
was probably not occupied. Id. at 456. This aspect of the search procedure was
emphasized by the district court. Id. at 461, 463.
4. The validity of an entry into an unoccupied dwelling, when challenged, has
usually been attacked by reference to a state statute regulating police procedures in
serving warrants, without reference to the constitutional implications. See, e.g.,
Thigpen v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 28, 299 P. 230 (1931). In the isolated situations
where a fourth amendment violation was alleged, the search has been sustained. See
United States v. Camarota, 278 F. 388 (S.D. Cal. 1922); People v. Johnson, 231
N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. County Ct. 1962).
5. 474 F.2d at 41.
6. 340 F. Supp. at 458-59. The district court pointed out that the concept of
a search separate from an arrest warrant was alien to the common law. Id. The
lower court relied on dicta in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765),
to support its position that any search of unoccupied premises was violative of the
common law. 340 F. Supp. at 460-61.
The court of appeals viewed Entick simply as an attack on the broad dis-
cretionary power granted to officers searching under a general warrant. 474 F.2d at 43.
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typical of the constitutionally prohibited "general search, ' 7 and that the
procedure followed by the Government in this case8 violated the "tradi-
tional sensibilities" of the citizenry. 9
The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's view of the
"historical context" of the fourth amendment, concluding that the search
of an unoccupied dwelling was not prohibited by the common law at
the time the amendment was adopted. 10 While the court recognized that
the purpose of the fourth amendment was to abolish the general warrant
to search and seize, it refused to connect the drafters' intention to prohibit
general searches with a desire to prevent specific searches of unoccupied
homes." Examining judicial interpretations of the amendment, the court
found significance in the very novelty of the argument raised by the
defendant.' 2 The fact that neither the Supreme Court nor any federal
court of appeals had ever indicated that the presence of the occupant
during an otherwise valid search of his dwelling was of constitutional
significance was noted by the court in support of its position that such
a procedure is not required by the fourth amendment.' 3 The failure of
rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to specify that the
occupant is required to be present during a search was also interpreted
as indicating that the Supreme Court did not recognize such a right.14
Having established that the defendant's position could not be main-
tained by resort to precedent,' 5 the court examined the merits of his
argument that this type of procedure should be considered unreasonable
and therefore constitutionally proscribed.' 6 The district court had iden-
7. 340 F. Supp. at 462. For a discussion of the relationship between the general
search and the development of the fourth amendment, see Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886).
8. The district court indicated that if the Government had established "exigent
circumstances" justifying its actions, the search of the appellee's dwelling would have
been permitted. 340 F. Supp. at 463. No such circumstances were found. Id.
9. Id. at 462-63. The district court asserted that a citizen has the right not to
return to his home to find the "doors hanging open" after a search by the state, since
"[a] man's home is still more his castle than this." Id. at 462. This "right to
privacy" aspect of the trial court's opinion was not discussed by Judge Hunter in his
opinion for the court of appeals.
10. 474 F.2d at 43.
11. Id. at 42-43.
12. These opinions by the district court and court of appeals appear to represent
the first extensive discussion of this point. See note 4 supra.
13. 474 F.2d at 43. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court has never
articulated the view espoused by the district court, despite having had "many oppor-
tunities" to do so. Id. Such "lost opportunities" included Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964), and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
14. 474 F.2d at 43-44. While rule 41 does not specify what procedures are to be
followed during a search under a valid warrant, section (d) does provide that if
any property is removed from the premises in the absence of its owner a copy of the
warrant and a receipt for the items taken must be left behind. A written inventory
of this property is required to be made in the presence of "at least one credible person"
if the owner is absent. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
15. 474 F.2d at 44.
16. The actual implementation of the challenged search had not been questioned
by the district court. See note 2 supra.
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tified a variety of dangers inherent in the procedure in question, 17 which
the court of appeals summarized under the twin headings of "general
search" and "pilferage."' 8 While the court recognized the potential for
such abuses, it concluded that the requirement of judicial supervision
provided adequate protection. 19
Implicit in the court's conclusion was its recognition of the lack of
correlation between that which the district court wanted. to achieve
20 
-
the avoidance of the dangers inherent in a general search - and the
means it had recommended to obtain that end - the requirement that the
occupant of the dwelling be present at the initiation of the search.21 In
observing that the presence of the occupant would be unlikely "to signifi-
cantly reduce the possibility of pilferage or a general search," 22 the
court noted two fairly common situations in which the occupant's pres-
ence at the start of the search would have little effect: (1) when the
occupant would be placed under arrest and removed from the premises
before the search was completed; and (2) when the search would involve
more than one officer, thus effectively preventing the occupant from moni-
toring all of its aspects.23 Since both of these procedures were presum-
ably unaffected by the district court's holding,24 the effectiveness of the
rule proposed by that decision was therefore open to serious doubt, and
the lower court's conclusion that the execution of the warrant in the
occupant's absence would increase the dangers of pilferage or a general
search25 was rejected by the court as unreasonable. 26
In vacating the order of the district court, the Third Circuit did
not choose to hold that all procedurally valid searches of unoccupied
residences were permissible. The court instead took the more limited
position that there was no rule which would render an otherwise reason-
able search invalid per se merely because the dwelling was unoccupied
at the time the warrant was executed. 27 Gervato would thus not seem to
preclude the possibility that a search of an unoccupied dwelling might
17. The dangers identified by the district court were unnecessary property dam-
age, police pilferage, and use of photographic equipment to conduct an "undetectable"
general search. 340 F. Supp. at 462.
18. 474 F.2d at 45.
19. Id.
20. The district court viewed the individual's right to privacy as a second basis
for its decision. This line of argument, however, was not fully developed by the lower
court. The court of appeals discussed the inadequacies it found to be inherent in the
"procedural safeguards" aspect of the trial court's opinion, but did not address the
"right to privacy" portion of that decision.
21. 474 F.2d at 45.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The district court did not elaborate on what degree of "presence" was
mandated, beyond indicating that the home should not be "entered" in the absence
of the occupant. 340 F. Supp. at 463-64.
25. 340 F. Supp. at 462.
26. 474 F.2d at 45. The court noted that these abuses could occur with equal
ease whether or not the occupant was present at the initiation of the search. Id.
27. Id. at 44.
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still, on another set of facts, be considered unreasonable and therefore
proscribed. 28
It is submitted that the decision reached by the Gervato court was
correct. While the arguments raised by the district court in favor of
vigilant control of search procedures may have been persuasive, its con-
clusion that the presence of the occupant at the inception of the search
would serve as a check on excessive police practices would seem ques-
tionable. 29 In the absence of any pragmatic justification for the proscrip-
tion of such an otherwise valid search, there would seem to be little merit-
in expanding the fourth amendment's concept of unreasonableness to en--
compass the search of an unoccupied dwelling.
A. 4. G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PROSECU-
TORIAL COMMENT ON DEFENDANT'S EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
IS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR.
United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager (3d Cir. 1973)
Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in state court.' During
summation to the jury, the prosecutor commented on the fact that the
petitioner had telephoned his attorney the day after the crime occurred.2 '
The defense neither objected to the comment nor requested instructions.
concerning it.8 After exhausting his state remedies, 4 the petitioner applied
28. While the Gervato court's functional approach to this subject would seem
to indicate that any entry into a vacant residence should be permitted as long as the-
Government could establish that it had acted under a valid warrant properly executed,
it should be noted that there was no evidence in this record of a conscious design on
the Government's part to wait until the defendant had departed before executing the-
warrant. If a situation were to arise in which an apparently valid search had been
purposely delayed until the residence under surveillance was vacated, a court that
was suspicious of the Government's actions and motives might well be able to dis-
tinguish Gervato on its facts, and hold that such an unexplained delay would be enough,
to render that particular search unreasonable and therefore invalid.
29. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra. Equally suspect was the em-
phasis placed by the lower court on the "knowing" aspect of the Government's action
in this case. The presence or absence of knowledge on the searcher's part as to the
occupancy of the dwelling would seem irrelevant to the policies identified by the
district court as mandating nonentry in the instant situation; if the reasons under-
lying the district court's holding were legitimate, then any entry, with or without
knowledge, should be proscribed.
1. United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613, 614 (3d Cir.), cert,
denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973).
2. The prosecutor's comment was:
He gets up the next morning and lo and behold, what does he do? He calls his
lawyer. These are acts of innocence?
Id. at 614 (emphasis supplied by the court).
3. Id.
4. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court. Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey also affirmed,
but reduced the term of imprisonment from 7 to 10 years to 2 to 5 years. State v.
Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 273 A.2d 1 (1971).
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for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, alleging that the remark
violated his sixth amendment right to counsel.5 The district court denied
the petition, holding that, although constitutional error had been committed,
"the effect on the trial was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require the
granting of petitioner's request for the Writ."6 The Third Circuit reversed,
holding that since credibility was a central issue and the evidence against
the defendant was not overwhelming, prosecutorial comment urging an
inference of guilt be drawn from the petitioner's exercise of his right to
counsel constituted prejudicial constitutional error. United States ex rel.
Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855
(1973).
The Macon court is the first to so decide this specific sixth amendment
issue. In Jones v. United States,7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit considered the similar question of whether
comment on a defendant's request for a lawyer immediately following a
ifatal shooting infringed his right to counsel. There, the court dismissed
the contention and held the comment proper where it represented an attack
on the defendant's version of crucial events concerning the crime.8 How-
ever, the dissent in Jones expressed the opinion that because the comment
was intended to establish a greater degree of guilt, it "penalized" the
defendant for the exercise of his constitutional right."
5. United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 336 F. Supp. 69, 71 (D.N.J. 1972).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that petitioner had waived his right to
claim error by failing to raise objection at trial. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333-34,
.273 A.2d 1, 5-6. The state admittedly has an interest in treating errors raised at trial
differently from those not timely challenged. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443,
452 (1965). However, federal courts considering a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus are not bound by state procedural rules and must permit a petitioner to raise
constitutional issues for the first time in federal court so long as state procedures
have not been deliberately bypassed. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
6. 336 F. Supp. at 71.
7. 296 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 913 (1962).
8. Id. at 404. The defendant had been convicted in federal district court of first
degree murder and assault with intent to kill. At trial, he did not deny involvement
in the crime, but raised the defense that he was not mentally conscious when he fired
four of the five gunshots. The court of appeals ruled that statements made by the
defendant, such as the request for a lawyer, were admissible as direct evidence of his
state of mind. Id. at 399-404. In ruling on the propriety of the prosecutor's comment,
the court stated:
This [defense of unconsciousness] was an obvious attempt to nullify intent.
The prosecutor attacked that defense factually and argumentatively. . . . The
prosecutor was under no obligation ... to refrain from testing Jones's account...
or to refrain from urging upon the jury the pertinence of these facts.
Id. at 404.
9. Id. at 409 (Fahy, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that, at the time of
trial the penalty for first degree murder in the District of Columbia was death. Thus,
Judge Fahy argued that to permit use of an accused's request for counsel as evidence
of deliberation or premeditation essential to first degree murder "is to permit an
accused to receive the death penalty" because he exercised his constitutional rights.
Id. at 410.
It should be noted, however, that unlike the Supreme Court in the later case
of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the dissent considered that to allow
comment of this type would be to infringe upon the exercise of the right itself,
"[flor constitutional . . . rights are often of no avail unless the use of evidence isjudicially tested by the adverse effect the use has upon the right." 296 F.2d at 410
(Fahy, J., dissenting).
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Other factual situations similar to that in the instant case, in which
courts have found constitutional error in prosecutorial use of the accused's
conduct have involved the admission and use of evidence. In Fagundes v.
United States,10 the First Circuit concentrated on the use of the defendant's
request for a lawyer and the exercise of his right to remain silent at time
of arrest to attack his credibility as a witness." Although the court noted
that the arresting officer's testimony as to the defendant's request for counsel
was related to, and descriptive of, the arrest, and was admissible, 12 it held
that it was reversible error to use that testimony for purposes of impeach-
ment.13 On the other hand, in Baker v. United States,1 4 the Fifth Circuit
held that introduction of evidence of the defendant's request for counsel
and refusal to speak during first questioning by an officer was itself re-
versible error.' The court in Baker said:
To have proven that appellant requested the right of counsel and
thereafter made no further statement was, we feel, as objectionable as
it would have been to comment on a defendant exercising his Consti-
tutional right not to take the witness stand.'"
Baker, the closest case, factually, to the instant opinion, represents
an extension of Griffin v. California17 wherein the Supreme Court held
that prosecutorial comment urging the jury draw an inference of guilt
from the defendant's failure to testify on his own behalf was violative of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 8 The Supreme
Court considered such comment "a penalty imposed by the courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege" which limited the privilege "by making
its assertion costly."' 19
The Third Circuit drew an analogy between the Griffin situation
involving the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel
in the instant case. For purposes of the "penalty" analysis, the court found
10. 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965).
11. Id. at 677.
12. Id. at 676. The defendant did not specifically object to this testimony and
the court did not discuss its admissibility in any detail. Id.
13. Id. at 677. The court also noted that to allow the use of such evidence as an
admission of guilt would have been error. Id. With regard to the use of the evidence
to impeach the defendant's testimony, the court stated:
[W]e think it reversible error to permit a jury to draw any inference adverse to
one accused of crime from his reliance upon his constitutional right to silence
and to the advice of counsel. The right to silence on arrest is akin to the right
to decline to take the witness stand in one's own defense.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. 357 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1966), noted in 52 VA. L. REV. 954 (196).
15. Id. The Fagundes court indicated that the defendant's statements were
admissible because they were descriptive of the arrest. Perhaps the fact that the
defendant in Baker was simply being questioned, apparently before actual arrest,
accounts for the ruling of inadmissibility, although the opinion in Baker does not
make clear what the pertinent facts were. See 52 VA. L. REV., supra note 14, at
955 & n.8.
16. 357 F.2d at 13-14.
17. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The Baker court did not cite Griflin but its opinion
strongly suggests reliance on it. See 52 VA. L. REV., supra note 14, at 956.
18. 380 U.S. at 614.
19. Id.
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no significant difference between the two." Consequently, the court felt
constrained to follow the Griffin analysis and focused on the effect of the
error on the particular defendant asserting the right.21
As no issue involving the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was presented in the instant case, application of Griffin was
not required. The question presented by the court's approach, then, is
whether, on the instant facts, the right to counsel can be equated to the
privilege against self-incrimination for purpose of the "penalty" analysis.
Griffin dealt with a factual setting in which it was more probable than
not that the defendant's conduct would raise an inference of guilt.2 Since
criminal defendants ordinarily rely on the assistance of counsel, it is at
least questionable whether jurors, unaided by any prosecutorial remarks,
are more likely than not to infer guilt from a defendant's exercise of his
sixth amendment right. It might, therefore, be argued that a Griffin analy-
sis was inapplicable in the instant case, and that Griffin should apply only
when an inference of guilt naturally flows from the defendant's conduct.
However, the Supreme Court in Griffin made it clear that the inference
which a jury might draw was not the key to its analysis.2a The court noted:
What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another.2 4
Consequently, it is not the inference which is actually drawn from the
accused's conduct that is objectionable, but rather the attention that the
prosecution directs toward the conduct. Therefore, even though there may
be no natural inference of guilt which flows from the exercise of one's
sixth amendment rights, for purposes of applying the Griffin "penalty"
analysis to prosecutorial comment, the court's conclusion that there is no
significant distinction between the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination is a valid one.
In concluding that application of Griffin to the present case warranted
the finding of constitutional error, the court of appeals agreed with the
finding of the district court.2 5 However, it applied the test of Chapman v.
California,2 and unlike the district court, was unable to conclude that
20. 476 F.2d at 615.
21. Id. at 616. The court noted, but declined to follow, the alternative mode of
analysis of focusing on whether the prosecutor's use of defendant's conduct would
"burden" the exercise of the constitutional right in question, i.e., would deter the
defendant or others from engaging in the constitutionally protected conduct. Id.
at 615-16.
22. Statistical studies have indicated that the majority of jurors notice failure to
testify and tend to infer guilt from silence. 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215, 22.1-22
(1968).
23. 380 U.S. at 614.
24. Id.
25. 476 F.2d at 616.
26. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court held inter alia that a
rule of automatic reversal shall not apply to all federal constitutional errors because
"there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are
so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Consti-
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the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."27 The court reasoned
that since critical portions of the evidence were disputed, the credibility of
the petitioner as a witness was a central issue.28 The court stated:
This is not a situation where the case against the petitioner was
otherwise "so overwhelming" that the constitutional error did not,
beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the conviction.2 9
Since the credibility of a defendant is one of the central issues in any
case in which the defendant testifies, 30 only in a very few cases where the
evidence actually is "overwhelming" would the conviction be affirmed.
Thus, the emphasis which the court placed on credibility, combined with
its application of the "absolutist" approach of Griffin,-3 1 makes the test
established one which will require reversal in almost all instances.
One rationale, not mentioned by the court, which supports its reversal
of the district court is that the real "penalty" suffered by the defendant
is his inability to obtain redress for prosecutorial misconduct at trial if his
own attorney has failed to object to it at trial.3 2 The requirement of objection
is sometimes obviated under the rule of plain error, which provides that
an error made at trial will be noticed despite lack of objection, if the error
so tainted the trial that it produced unfairness or bias toward the defendant.3
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs most frequently during closing argu-
ments,3 4 yet objection by the defense attorney at this time can itself call
attention to the comment and reinforce any resulting prejudice.3 -5 Thus,
closing argument represents a critical time during trial for a defendant in
that he can be "penalized" by either raising an objection or by failing to
do so. Apparently, the Macon court has eliminated the need -for objection
tution, be deemed harmless." Id. at 21-22. The Court ruled, however, that the bene-
ficiary of a constitutional error must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 22-24.
27. 476 F.2d at 617 (emphasis supplied by the court).
28. Id. at 616.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. The vast majority of defendants in criminal trials actually do testify. See
4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB., supra note 22, at 222 & n.49.
31. The "absolutist" approach of Griffin focuses on whether the defendant was
adversely affected by the error, as opposed to whether the exercise of the right was
or will be "burdened" by the error. 476 F.2d at 615-16. See note 21 and accompany-
ing text supra.
32. The general approach of both state and federal courts is that failure to raise
an objection to an offer of evidence is a waiver upon appeal of any claim of error.
McCORMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 52 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
33. McCoRMicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 32. In
federal court, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provide that plain
error or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed even though objection was
not raised at trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). It is interesting to note that, while
most state and federal courts do apply this doctrine, they do not actually refer to
it as the "plain error rule." Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and
Trial Judges, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 629, 650 (1972) ; Singer, Forensic Misconduct by
Federal Prosecutors and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227, 242 (1968).
34. Alschuler, supra note 33, at 648.
35. Id. at 649; Singer, supra note 33, at 243.
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by adopting a test of constitutional error which is sufficiently stringent to
make prosecutors sensitive to its requirements.80
Given the applicability of the Griffin rationale to constitutional errors
other than comment on a defendant's failure to testify, and the peculiar
sensitivity of prosecutors to stringent rules of reversal,83 it would appear
that this decision will have the salutary effect of controlling prosecutorial
misconduct.
K.A.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PREJUDICIAL
DISPLAY OF ACCUSED IN NEWS MEDIA PRIOR TO FORMAL IDENTIFI-
CATION AFFECTS CREDIBILITY BUT NOT ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWIT-
NESS TESTIMONY.
United States v. Zeiler (3d Cir. 1972)
Defendant Zeiler, the alleged "Commuter Bandit," was convicted of
bank robbery.' Extensive press coverage had accompanied his arrest and
four eyewitnesses who identified him at trial admitted that they had viewed
television news programs which reported the arrest and which included
pictures of the defendant in the custody of police and FBI agents. 2 Addi-
tionally, three of the four witnesses had seen his picture compared in the
newspapers with a composite sketch which had previously been released. 3
The defendant appealed,4 contending that exposure to such intensive
36. For a discussion of the argument that a rule of automatic reversal should
apply to errors involving prosecutorial misconduct, see Mause, Harmless Constitu-
tional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519, 552-
54 (1969).
37. See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 646-47.
1. United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717, 718 (3d Cir. 1972), The nickname
"Commuter Bandit" was given by the press to a lone gunman who had robbed
more than 15 banks in the Pittsburgh area over a 5-year period. Zeiler was found
guilty of three robberies, including one in Bloomfield, Pa., and the witnesses challenged
on this appeal were present at that robbery. Id. United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993,
994 (3d Cir. 1971).
2. 470 F.2d at 719.
3. Id. United States v. Zeiler, 278 F. Supp. 112, 113 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
4. Following his original convictions, the defendant filed a motion in arrest ofjudgment, for a new trial, or for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. United
States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (conviction for one robbery;
denial of motions for the other trial not reported). Zeiler then appealed, claiming
that he was denied his sixth amendment right to have counsel present when the
police showed photographic displays containing his picture to witnesses after he
had been taken into custody, and contending that the photographic displays shown
to witnesses by the police were overly suggestive. The court of appeals reversed
the convictions, holding that he had improperly been denied counsel, and remanded
the cases to the district court for determination of whether the identification should
be suppressed on the grounds that the displays had been suggestive. United States
v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REv. 741 (1971). The
district court suppressed all the identifications, including those challenged in the
instant case, but the court of appeals reversed the suppression of the Bloomfield
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publicity made the witnesses' identifications inherently suspect.5 The Third
Circuit affirmed, holding that while some prejudice might be unavoidable,
the accused's rights were adequately protected by cross-examination of
identifying witnesses and by instructions to the jury to take such exposure
into consideration when evaluating the credibility of the witnesses' testi-
mony. United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1972).
In the absence of applicable authority for the precise issue presented
in the instant case, the defendant relied upon two analogous lines of cases
to support his contention that the identifications should have been excluded:
decisions dealing with the suppression of identifications obtained following
improper lineups or suggestive photographic displays; and cases involving
the prejudicial affects of pretrial publicity on jurors."
Recognizing the serious possibility of injustice presented by mistaken
eyewitness identification, the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade7
and subsequent cases, particularly Simmons v. United Statess developed
an exclusionary rule barring the testimony of an eyewitness in certain
situations where the "identification procedure was so impermissibly sug-
gestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification." 9 However, both Wade and Simmons focused on the im-
proper conduct of law enforcement officials who employed suggestive lineup
techniques or manipulated a defendant's photograph, either to reinforce
previous uncertain identifications or to encourage selection of a particular
suspect.' 0 Neither case raised the question of the prejudicial effects of
non-official press activity. Zeiler contended that the Simmons rule should
be broadly construed to require that, in all cases, identifications which had
been unduly influenced by suggestive photographs be ruled inadmissible,
and to render the legal, as well as the practical, consequences of a prejudicial
viewing of the defendant in the news media indistinguishable from those of
a similar viewing at a police station."
identifications and reinstated them. United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir.
1971). Following the reinstatement, Zeiler was again convicted. 470 F.2d 717, 718
(3d Cir. 1972). The instant appeal was submitted pursuant to Third Circuit Rule
12(6) which provides for appeal without oral argument.
5. 470 F.2d 717, 718. The defendant's argument concerning the alleged detri-
mental effects of the pretrial publicity on the witnesses' identifications had been
rejected previously by the district court at the original suppression hearing. 278
F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Pa. 1968). However, the issue had not been discussed in the
two previous appeals to the Third Circuit. 470 F.2d at 718.
6. 470 F.2d at 719. For a discussion of the Third Circuit position regarding the
effects of pretrial publicity on jurors, see United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager,
472 F.2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973).
7. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
9. Id. at 384.
10. Id. at 383-84; 388 U.S. at 233-35. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440(1969) (repeated lineups emphasizing the defendant's presence), wherein the Court
stated :
The suggestive elements in this identification made it all but inevitable that
[he] would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact "the man." In effect,
the police repeatedly said to the witness, "This is the man."
Id. at 443 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
11. 470 F.2d at 719-20.
[VOL. 19
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/5
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
The Third Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that Zeiler had
misconstrued Simmons, which held only that, in some instances, it would
be a denial of due process to admit eyewitness testimony which, because of
improperly suggestive police procedure, should be presumed unreliable -
not that all potentially unreliable identifications were inadmissible as a
matter of law.' 2 The Zeiler court noted that in the instant case there was
no evidence to indicate that the police had affirmatively sought to use the
news media to influence witnesses, and took the position that, absent such
a showing, relief should not be granted especially where the alleged preju-
dice was a consequence of the free exercise by the press of its first amend-
ment privilege to report the news. 13 The court stated that to accept the
defendant's contention that Simmons was controlling in situations involv-
ing nonofficial conduct would imply an affirmative duty on the part of the
police not to release official photographs prior to formal identification
proceedings, and more importantly, the duty to suppress any photographs
which might be acquired by the media without official cooperation.1 4 Such
a suggestion, the court noted, would go far beyond any current Supreme
Court holdings concerning the possible detrimental effects of pretrial pub-
licity, 15 and would raise serious first amendment questions."6
In addition to the argument based on Wade and Simmons, the defend-
ant contended that, as exposure to pretrial publicity may disqualify a juror,
it should have an analogous effect upon witnesses.' 7 The court also rejected
this argument, reasoning that traditionally courts have had workable tools
to screen out and replace biased jurors,' 8 but that "[wlitnesses are not so
12. 390 U.S. at 381-84. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209(1973), wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the only photographs
too prejudicial to be released to the press prior to the trial were those for which
the police had posed the defendant, either at the scene of the crime or otherwise
reenacting it.
13. 470 F.2d at 720. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE - STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
(App. Draft 1968) (publication of a defendant's picture at the time of arrest does
not exceed or conflict with the acceptable standards for fair crime news reporting as
recommended by ABA).
14. 470 F.2d at 720.
15. Id. The Supreme Court decisions which concern pretrial publicity focus
primarily on its effect on jurors or potential jurors. See Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966) ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). While there has
been occasional discussion about the lack of discretion exercised by the newspapers
in publicizing prejudicial material and the need to enforce some form of contempt
power, see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring), the remedies generally involve improvements in jury screening techniques
rather than contempt proceedings against the press, or the imposition of restraints
on the publishers. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ; Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961).
16. 470 F.2d at 720. Another consideration which may have influenced the
court was its reluctance to suppress competent evidence where there had been no
claim that government agents violated any constitutionally protected right of the
defendant to secure the evidence. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)(primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to curb official misconduct by making
such misconduct counterproductive).
17. 470 F.2d at 719.
18. These tools include voir dire, changes of venue and venire, sequestration
of the jury, and continuances. For an analysis of the various options available to
a trial judge faced with potentially prejudicial publicity, see Meyer, The Trial
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fungible. Disqualification of jurors because of exposure to pretrial pub-
licity does not prevent trying a defendant; disqualification of witnesses may
have that effect."' 9 Rather than exclude such witnesses the court deter-
mined that the danger of misidentification could be sufficiently averted by
cross-examination, and that even though an identification might have been
tainted by pretrial publicity, the jury, when properly charged,20 could
evaluate the effects of such exposure, as they would other intangible evi-
dence when weighing the credibility of the identifying witnesses. 2'
It is submitted that the Third Circuit properly refused to extend the
rationale of those cases dealing with prejudicial pre-trial publicity as it
relates to jurors and the actions of law enforcement officials in the instant
case. While Zeiler was undoubtedly subjected to a certain risk of mistaken
identification, such risk raised questions only as to the accuracy of the
criminal proceeding as a fact-finding mechanism, whereas the cases to
which defendant sought analogy presented constitutional issues which raised
questions concerning the integrity of that proceeding. While there is a
constitutional right to an impartial jury, there is, as the Zeiler court noted,
no comparable right to an impartial witness.2 2 Nor does the fourteenth
amendment which protects a defendant against a denial of due process pur-
port to safeguard persons from the prejudicial impact of private action.
Having found that the record in the instant case did not support an allega-
tion that law enforcement officials encouraged the publication of defend-
ant's photograph,23 the Zeiler court was able to avoid the thornier issue of
Judge's Guide to News Reporting and Fair Trials, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 287
(1969).
19. 470 F.2d at 720.
20. The court noted that the Third Circuit had previously approved the
Pennsylvania approach to jury instructions regarding the proper weight to be given
to eyewitness testimony. United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1971).
The court indicated that an instruction based on Barber would have adequately
protected Zeiler had he raised the issue at trial. 470 F.2d at 720 n.4.
21. The court's assurances as to the sufficiency of the present safeguards are
not wholly convincing, for it is not at all certain that the jury would always
be able to correctly determine whether an identification had been distorted by
publicity. See Dearinger v. United States, 468 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1973). The
Dearinger case illustrates how damaging the premature publication of a defendant's
photograph may be. In that case, the witnesses had been unable to pick the de-
fendant out of police photographic displays prior to the lineup, and had given
uncertain descriptions at the time of the robbery. However, after the local news-
papers carried pictures identifying the defendants as suspects, the witnesses were
all able to make positive identifications, at the lineup, and again, at trial. Thejury disregarded this evidence and accepted the identification. Id. at 1037-41
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
22. 470 F.2d at 719.
23. Zeiler's appeal did allege that the police had affirmatively assisted the news
media in publicizing photographs of the arrest, but the sole evidence offered to
support this potential due process claim was an offhand remark by one of the
escorting officers. 470 F.2d at 719. In dismissing Zeiler's claim of affirmative official
action, the court noted that:
No evidence was presented that the pretrial publicity was controlled or directed
by law enforcement authorities. Nor was there evidence that the arrest
publicity was designed by them as a pre-line-up identification technique. Nothing
in the record indicates that law enforcement authorities had set up a "meet
the press" conference with Zeiler.
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